Abstract

Department of Defense (DOD) use of commercial networks entails unprecedented reliance on untrusted third-party communications infrastructure, and the associated risk of exposing DOD communications to an adversary. Traversing adversary-controlled infrastructure allows DOD’s adversaries to recognize, disrupt, or extract intelligence even from encrypted communications. The resulting arms race of obfuscation vs intelligence techniques is inherently limited: with each new obfuscation, DOD can never know if it fools the adversary, or if the adversary is lulling DOD into a false sense of security.

Metadata

publication

MILCOM 2024-2024 IEEE Military Communications Conference (MILCOM), 647-648, 2024

year

2024

publication date

2024/10/28

authors

Alexander Marder, Jon Larrea, Kc Claffy, Erik Kline, Kyle Jamieson, Bradley Huffaker, Lincoln Thurlow, Matthew Luckie

link

https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/10773840/

conference

MILCOM 2024-2024 IEEE Military Communications Conference (MILCOM)

pages

647-648

publisher

IEEE